Are our intellectual property (IP) institutions effective for a new generation of digi-tal innovations? To make progress on this question, this paper analyzes a novel dataset on mobile app developers' use of patents and copyright, product revenues, licensing and outsourcing, and product and developer characteristics. We find within-industry het-erogeneity in patent and copyright use, even among seemingly similar suppliers selling similar products. This pattern of IP use, along with consequent revenues and propensity to engage in IP trade is closely associated with the specific nature of innovations em-bodied in the products. Therefore, whereas patent and copyright use historically have differed across industries while tending to be similar across suppliers within the same industry, the ?mash-up? nature of digital products (amalgams of programs, datasets, graphics, algorithms, etc.) results in unusually finer-grained differences within indus-tries. Pliant digital product development choices and IP choices go hand-in-hand.
Introduction
The capitalist system critically depends on effective property rights, with intellectual property rights playing an especially important role in affecting the creation and diffusion of new technologies, methodologies, ideas, technologies, discoveries and creative works. However, our institutions governing intellectual property rights today were established centuries ago, in periods in which industrial composition differed a great deal. For example, in the United States, the establishment of a national system of patents and copyright was concurrent to the founding of the Constitution, with the first Patent Act drafted in 1790.
1 At the time, the United States was transitioning from an economy dominated by small, independent farms and primary extraction, to secondary processing and manufacture of textiles and goods.
Leading areas for patenting were mechanics, materials processing and handling, agriculture, animal husbandry, food, and heating (Marco et al., 2015) . Copyright was primarily directed to books, translations, and derivative works, at a time in which the means of production and replication of these things had not yet widely diffused. Notwithstanding numerous amendments and evolving legal precedents, essential features of our patent and copyright frameworks remain intact. 2 Now, software and digital technologies are diffusing to most every sector of the economy (Branstetter et al., 2018; World Economic Forum, 2017) and may even lead us into a "second machine age" (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014) , resulting in a transformation of industrial composition. Enforceability and effectiveness of IP rights depend on industry characteristics and the nature of production technologies (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Arora et al., 2008; Moser, 2005 Moser, , 2013 , raising the question of what will become of analog IP rights in a digital world (Lessig, 2008) ? Do existing IP institutions effectively 1 The Massachusetts General Court granted the first patent in the colonies considerably earlier, in 1641, for a salt-making process. Original legal models were defined still earlier, dating to fifteenth-century Renaissance Italy. In 1416, the Venetian Grand Council awarded one of the earliest recorded patents to Franciscus Petri for a device for fulling fabrics (Mandich, 1960) . By 1474, the Venetian Republic established a more general system of patent law (Biagioli, 2011) . England later formalized copyright law in the 1710 Statute of Queen Anne, granting printers exclusive rights to sell books for 14 years (Kahn, 2005) .
2 In his review, David (1993) observes, "Though the legal provisions and administrative rules that make up the patents system and the copyright system have changed considerably in form and function through its long history, they remain remarkably resistant to rapid and radical reform."
convey property rights to digital innovators?
A number of characteristics of digital technologies might-on their own--suggest a dim view of digital IP use and effectiveness. This includes the ease of replication, reverseengineering, and re-use inherent to digital technologies (Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2002) .
Further enforcement challenges arise from online distribution and the sheer scale of the Internet, with tens of billions of searchable pages and billions more individuals and organizations spread across legal jurisdictions, sometimes anonymously.
At the same time, the relevant practical benchmark for effectiveness is hardly one of perfect enforceability (e.g., Anton and Yao, 2004) . For example, even partial, stochastic, or targeted enforcement (on, say, closest competitors) might, on their own, confer some degree of protections. Thus, the question of enforceability is an empirical question. These questions also deserve empirical analysis given that the law and legal precedent have evolved somewhat independently in the case of digital IP, as with, for example, amendments introduced to law with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. Means of detecting violations in digital IP are also evolving somewhat independently. This increasingly takes the form of algorithmic scanning and crawling of the Internet and machine-based methods. Where competing products are each observable on the same digital marketplace, a simple text-based search might also readily identify all relevant comparable IP.
Adding to the empirical question of enforceability, in digital industries there will often be scope for more than the "usual suspects" to influence enforceability. Apart from IP owners, would-be violators, and central authorities, the online supply chain and architecture often involves many technical layers and complements, leading platform owners and other infrastructure providers to play a role. For example, Youtube routinely disables user-generated videos and music with a "fair use" notice. Many of these actors may have their own responsibilities and obligations in enforcing IP in the eyes of the law (Sag, 2017) , and will also have their strategic interests in shaping enforcement.
To date, empirical research on digital IP rights (reviewed in the following section) provides mixed findings on use and effectiveness. For example, in many cases, as in the evaluation of music piracy, it has been productive to begin by simply presuming limited enforceability, and to immediately proceed to evaluate implications of limited enforceability (e.g., Oberholzer et al., 2015; Waldfogel, 2012; Danaher and Smith, 2014) . A handful of other pioneering studies have more closely calibrated implications of exerting or relieving IP enforcement, finding varying indications of enforceability (e.g., Williams, 2013; Reimers, 2016; Luo and Mortimer, 2017) . Here, we build on these past results-finding that such mixed results should increasingly become the norm.
As a starting point for arguments, of course, patents and copyright provide different kinds of rights. Patents convey rights to an invention that meets the criteria of novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness. Patents apply to the underlying design, the fundamental guiding principles, concepts and ideas, machines, processes, products and, in cases, codifiable composition (as in a molecule). By contrast, copyright entails a narrower granting of rights.
This includes exclusive rights to the original expression of ideas, rather than the underlying idea, itself (subject to certain "fair use" of limited reproduction with attribution). Thus, copyright applies to a precise rendering of a creation, rather than to design concepts or underlying ideas.
4 Therefore, at least as a first-order characterization, overall designs should tend to be better protected by patents; precise content should tend to be better protected by copyright.
Historically, these differences in patents and copyright have led them to apply differently across industries, in relation to fixed differences in the nature of innovation and production technologies across industries. For example, firms in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing tend to use patents, whereas copyright is more frequently used in creative industries (Mansfield, 1986; MacGarvie and Moser, 2014) . Prima facie, we might expect this sort of mapping of IP rights to industry sectors to extend to new digital contexts. For example, surely a digital book remains a book, whether it be in paper or digital format-and textbased expression should most naturally fall under copyright. Similar arguments follow for, say, music and photographs. Other digital creations, such as software design, instructions, and algorithms, regarded as "machines" of a sort by the law, now tend to fall under patents (after some changes in law over past decades 5 ).
Consistent with regular mappings of IP use to industry sectors, much of the pioneering research on digital IP rights tends to study either patents or copyright within specific contexts. For example, copyright has been studied in digital images (Luo and Mortimer, 2017; Nagaraj, 2017) , videos (Aguiar and Martens, 2016) , music (Oberholzer et al., 2015; Waldfogel, 2012; Danaher and Smith, 2014) , digital books and magazines (MacGarvie and Moser, 2014; Reimers, 2016) . Patents have been studied in relation to digital algorithms (Hall and MacGarvie, 2010) , software (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2011) , and codified genome sequences (Williams, 2013; Sampat and Williams, 2017) .
We argue here, however, that the usual tendency of IP choices to map clearly to distinct industry sectors, as per observations above, should break down in many digital contexts, 5 In the mid-20th century during their early history, software programs and instructions were not considered to be novel or non-obvious ideas or forms of expression (Lemley et al., 2006) . However, the emergence of a commercial software industry in the 1970s finally led companies to begin to apply copyright in large numbers (Samuelson, 1993) , likening instructions to written original creative works or expressions. The radical shift in practice and norms this would entail is famously captured by Bill Gates's famous 1976 open letter to hobbyists, in which he expressed dismay at the rampant copyright infringement of software at the time. A series of legal precedents through the 1980s affirmed this use of copyright, both in protecting source code and certain aspects of "look and feel" (see Lerner and Zhu, 2007 for a more complete discussion). These rights were found to be severely limited, however, by competitors' ability to devise similar solutions without precisely copying the precise expression of source code (Koski and Kretschmer, 2004). Famously, in Lotus v. Borland (516 U.S. 233, 1996) , Lotus was unable to enforce IP rights over its innovative drop-down graphical menus and this eventually became a feature of most every software product (see Lemley et al., 2006, p.73) . At the same time, as copyright was foundering as a means of IP rights enforcement, patenting was becoming an option (Bessen and Hunt, 2007) . In the 1994 decision "In re Alapatt," the Federal Circuit ruled that a computer program that performed a specific and identifiable function were patentable inventions. A computer program could then be considered the digital equivalent of "a specific machine"-and could be patented (Mossoff, 2014) . Lerner and Zhu (2007) find that firms affected by the diminution of copyright disproportionately accelerated patenting in subsequent years. Bessen & Hunt's (2007) analysis found a 40 percent increase in patenting propensity in the US since 1980, with about half this increase coming from software. Nonetheless, the fine points of the question of whether and when software should be considered expression or function and design remain a question, as in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (No. 14-1351 Fed. Cir. 2015 .
and do so with growing frequency in years to come. This is because digital products are increasingly "mash-ups," amalgams of programming instructions, data sets, information feeds, algorithms, graphics, user-generated content, audio streams, and videos. This makes digital products extraordinarily pliant, pliable, plastic and recombinant in their composition and nature. Differentiating attributes of digital product mash-ups are far less fixed than those in physical or analog industries (Lessig, 2008; Stoneman, 2010) . For example, today's video games are no longer only composed of machine-readable instructions; they now are composed of images and artwork, characters and videos, and algorithms and analytical engines to do things such as simulate the laws of physics. Similarly, today's mapping software often combines codified street maps, satellite images, navigation software and vast databases describing all possible destinations and their attributes, using public and proprietary data sets and user-generated data.
We argue that just as digital mash-ups allow for considerably more discretion in product development choices, they should lead to corresponding heterogeneity of IP choices. Take, for example, mobile app game studio Rovio's Angry Birds. This app has relatively straightforward gameplay, but features iconic bird and pig characters and storyline, leading to an emphasis on copyright enforcement.
6 By contrast, mobile game maker Zynga has placed less emphasis on iconic graphics or characters in games such as Farmville or Words-with-Friends.
What is more, Zynga's games do not rely on particularly unique or even very nuanced gameplay. However, developing games with social interactions at their core, and featuring "gamification" tactics to provoke repeated play, and doing so for tiny mobile screens connected wirelessly has led to patenting portfolios in these areas.
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To assess whether the preceding points lead to broad-based within-industry heterogeneity of IP choices linked to product development choices, we study a novel data set on the Apple 6 In 2014, for instance, the Finnish studio filed for copyright violations against vending machine importer and operator Toy Amazon Corp. of Monterey Park, Calif., for selling counterfeit Angry Birds products. The U.S. District court awarded Rovio $4.3 million. The company in other areas has not prosecuted violators, such as in China, where the company has publicly stated a hope that piracy will boost the awareness and popularity of its games.
7 https://patents.justia.com/company/zynga App Store. Mobile apps are representative of many modern digital products on the cusp of becoming fully-fledged mash-ups. Despite apps nominally being a type of software (i.e., applications software programs), apps can be differentiated on the basis of either design (e.g., software instructions, approaches to human-computer interface, algorithms, etc.), content (e.g., data sets, user content, information feeds, graphical designs, etc.), or both. Even apps similarly containing, say, software, algorithms, and graphical designs may differ in which among these are innovative and the basis for differentiation relative to other apps.
The dataset is created by matching observational data that was machine-collected from Apple's platform to detailed survey-based data. The combined data set allows us to observe developer's use of patents and copyright, product-level revenues, licensing and outsourcing, and product and developer characteristics. The sampling frame is determined by the survey, covering 7,973 products by 809 developers. As reviewed herein, the sample is similar to the population regarding coverage of market niches, age cohorts, user-reported quality, and other characteristics.
The central goal of the empirical analysis is to assess whether there exists significant within-industry heterogeneity in IP choices and resulting effectiveness and whether this is systematically linked to the nature of innovations embodied in products. We test these points three ways:
1. Heterogeneous IP use among seemingly similar suppliers: Among developers-not only within the same industry, but selling products in the same category, and with similar characteristics (age, size, etc.)-those whose products embodied differentiated, innovative design were 17 percent more likely to use patents (but no more likely to use copyright). Similarly, those whose products embodied differentiated, innovative content were 29 percent more likely to use registered copyright use (but no more likely to use patents).
Heterogeneous performance consequences (revenues):
Across seemingly similar developers and products, we find that patent use is associated with 44 percent higher revenues for products embodying differentiated, innovative design innovations (and not for those embodying differentiated content). Registered copyright use is associated with 23 percent higher revenues for products embodying differentiated, innovative content (and not for those embodying differentiated design).
3. Heterogenous propensity to trade IP : In relation to IP supporting the "market for ideas"
and IP trade (Gans and Stern, 2003; Arora et al., 2004) , across seemingly similar developers, the incidence of licensing or sale of apps is 33 percent higher with patent use for products embodying differentiated, innovative design. (No statistically significant relationships with IP trade were found with copyright.)
Each of the above analyses requires effectively estimating "all-else-being-equal" relationships between the nature of innovations embodied in products and IP choices, or consequences thereof. Therefore, instead of say exploiting institutional shocks over time (e.g., Lerner and Zhu, 2007; Moser, 2013; Galasso and Schankerman, 2015) , the research question and arguments most naturally invite econometric comparisons that are cross-sectional (e.g., Bessen
and Hunt 2007; Arora et al. 2004 ). This reliance on cross-sectional comparisons places special demands on the empirical research design.
On the one hand, econometric comparisons have the straightforward interpretation of showing how IP choices and consequent revenues and IP trade decisions covary among seemingly similar suppliers that make different product design choices. On the other hand, IP and product development choices are endogenous, introducing the possibility of omitted variable bias. For this reason, the empirical analysis includes a barrage of robustness tests and alternative model estimates, including the use of coarse exact matching (CEM) and instrumental variables (IV) estimators. As a diagnostic, we can also exploit the highly useful fact that interactions between (i) patents and content and between (ii) copyright and design should be zero (in the absence of omitted variable bias).
Each of the three sets of findings suggests a close link between product innovation and design and IP choices-made possible by the pliant, recombinant nature of digital mash-ups. Given this situation, it may not be meaningful to speak of the effectiveness of patents in this industry without simultaneously considering copyright (and vice versa) and without considering heterogeneity in the precise nature of innovations embodied in products. Conventional approaches to estimating the overall mean effectiveness of patents (or copyright)
across an industry would underestimate joint and contingent effectiveness of IP institutions working together. The findings also uncover ample scope for firm strategy, as product development choices and IP choices should "go together." The conventional wisdom that IP strategies should be similar across firms within an industry is misleading in this case, and the associated tendency to follow practices of peer suppliers may be counter-productive..
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical analysis then proceeds in three sections. Section 4 studies patent and registered copyright choices. Section 5 studies consequent performance, in terms of product revenues. Section 6 5) studies the propensity to engage in IP trade and its relationship with IP choices. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Existing empirical research provides mixed and varied findings on the use and effectiveness of digital IP rights. As regards software patenting, for example, a string of empirical studies documents associations between patent use and indications of the enforceability of property rights, including entry deterrence MacGarvie, 2011, 2009 ), market valuation (Hall et al., 2005) , survival rates (Wagner and Cockburn, 2010) , and sales volumes (Lerner and Zhu, 2007) .
In seeming contrast to the above findings, software patents appear to be little used. Using data on 28,268 software patents and 148,552 total patents matched by CUSIP to firms in
Compustat, Bessen and Hunt (2007) Bessen (2003) finds they often use patents for strategic purposes rather than necessarily for enforcing IP rights. Hall and MacGarvie (2010) find no significant stock market valuation effects associated with patents for pure software firms. As regards copyright, as noted in the introduction, copyright has diminished in prevalence in software since the 1980s.
As regards other digital creations beyond software, there are similarly mixed and varied results. Here, many studies begin with the presumption of weak IP rights, rather than necessarily directly testing the point. For example, a growing stream of work in digitally recorded music tests implications for both product demand (Waldfogel, 2012; Oberholzer et al., 2015; Givon et al., 1995; Reimers, 2016; Nagaraj, 2017) and supply-side provision of products (e.g., Mortimer et al., 2012; Givon et al., 1995; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006; Waldfogel and Aguiar, 2018) . This work on weak IP rights in recorded music also tends to focus on consumer piracy rather than involuntary spillovers to competitors. In digital stock photos, work by Luo and Mortimer (2017) begins with a similar presumption of widespread piracy, with tens of thousand copyright violations observed. The authors proceed to show, through an experiment, that violators were more likely to accede to copyright by informal requests rather than to formal legal requests, threats and price-related factors Luo and Mortimer (2017) .
A handful of other studies more directly examine effects of applying or, alternatively, removing property right protections. For example, Nagaraj (2017) shows that copyright protection of the magazine Baseball Digest (vs. the out-of copyright issues) led to 135 percent fewer images being shared and reused on Wikipedia, and a readership reduction of the copyrighted pages by 20 percent. Heald (2014) finds that copyrighted music is less frequently used in movies than non-copyrighted music. Within domains of academic and commercial science, Williams (2013) found that the use of a particular contract-based form of IP in the case of the human genome, led to a 20-30 percent reduction of subsequent scientific research and product development efforts. However, in later related work, Sampat and Williams (2015) found that, on average, gene-related patents had no significant effect on follow-on research.
Dataset
The data studied here cover fine-grained differences across suppliers in a data set covering 809 app developers and 7,973 apps on the Apple App Store. The sample is defined by a surveybased dataset covering both patent and copyright use, product-level revenues, licensing and outsourcing, and product and developer characteristics. We simultaneously machine-collected observational data from the full population of all developers and products on the Apple App Store. Table I reports means, standard deviations, and correlations of main variables used in the analysis, presented at the product unit of observation.
Measures
< Table I> IP and Copyright Use. We use survey responses to construct indicator variables, P AT EN T and COP Y RIGHT , switched on for developers who use patents and registered copyright, respectively. We do not distinguish among different possible classes of patents. We do distinguish here whether copyright had been formally registered with the U.S. Copyright Office (i.e., rather than "default" coverage provided by copyright law without explicit registration).
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Revenues. Where IP rights are enforceable and effective, holders should enjoy a greater degree of monopoly power and therefore higher price or greater sales, all else being equal.
For example, Li et al. (2015) find that copyright length (a measure of degree of effectiveness)
is positively related to price. In this context, app prices are pegged to discrete increments (i.e., zero, 99 cents, $1.99, $2.99, etc.) and do not cover in-app purchases. Therefore, we focus on revenues as a whole, including sales volumes derived from both download prices and in-app purchases. We generated an estimated level of product-level revenues, REVENUES, using the method of Garg and Telang (2013) . The method entails using data observable on the App Store, such as sales rankings and price as a basis for estimating revenues.
Licensing and Outsourcing. Where IP rights are enforceable and effective, it should be more practicable to engage in the trade of intellectual property and to enable a "market for ideas" (Gans and Stern, 2003; Arora et al., 2004) . Here, we define variable IP_TRADE as an indicator variable, switched on where the developer engages in either licensing or outright sale of apps and app technologies to other firms (rather than just directly retailing of apps to consumers). This measure was also taken from the survey.
Innovations Embodied in Products. We considered a number of approaches to measuring the different digital elements contained in apps, and which could be considered innovative, including text-based analysis and expert judgment. We chose a survey-based measure, in which we directly asked the supplier whether and how they intended to differentiate their product. This approach had the advantage of most accurately capturing the intended and expected basis of innovative differentiation, while drawing on the developers' own detailed technical knowledge of the design.
We constructed two measures, one to reflect innovative differentiation on the basis of design (DESIGN ) and another to reflect innovative differentiation on the basis of content (CONTENT ). The measures were constructed by asking developers how they intended to distinguish their products from those of competitors, while presenting a list of options (to which they could check a box in the affirmative or not).
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The variable DESIGN sums the number of affirmative responses in relation to differentiation on the basis of a different or novel type of app, or rapid software updates and versioning.
The variable CONTENT sums the number of affirmative responses in relation to content including information or user-generated content. Therefore, these measures of creating novel apps in relation to design or content should be viewed as capturing coarse, but meaningful variation in each of these dimensions.
Developer and Product Characteristics. The dataset also includes developer-and product-level covariates. From observational data drawn from the platform, measures include the market niche or category of each individual app (a series of twenty seven indicator variables corresponding to app categories described on the App Store 10 ), the average quality rating on the basis of user feedback on a 5-point scale, and entry timing (first appearance date). From the survey, we also observe developer size as a categorical variable (part-time, 1-employee, 2-employees, 3-5 employees, 11-20 employees, 21-50 employees, and >50 employees), and an indication of whether they are an amateur hobbyist developer or not, and a series of indicator variables related to how the developer derives income (i.e., downloads, in-app purchases, advertising, complementary service or good).
9 The order in which options were presented was randomized and there was no compulsion to necessarily respond in the affirmative to any option.
10 Categories are Books, Business, Catalogs, Developer Tools, Education, Entertainment, Finance, Food and Drink, Games, Graphics and Design, Health and Fitness, Healthcare, Lifestyle, Medical, Music, Navigation, News, Photo and Video, Photography, Productivity, Reference, Social Networking, Sports, Travel, Utilities, Video, and Weather.
Survey Sample Selection
The survey data collection defines the sample available for the analysis, as observational data from the platform cover the entire population. The survey data were generated by first machine crawling the entire U.S. Apple App Store in 2013, covering 253,100 app developers.
Of these, a subset of 23,048 developers listed a contact email address within their product descriptions on the App Store. We algorithmically extracted these email addresses and this became our mail-out list. We programmed a web-based survey and hosted it on university servers. Of the recipients, 809 developers of 7,973 products provided completed responses.
Despite the relatively large number of respondents in relation to past survey-based studies of IP rights, 11 the sample is small in relation to the population. Anticipating this outcome when designing the research approach, we proceeded with a design that does not rely on random sampling. As it turned, out the sample distribution and domain coverage are roughly similar to those of the population, as shown in Table II 
Use of IP Rights by Developers
In this section, we estimate the relationship between IP choices (PATENT, COPYRIGHT ) and product design choices (DESIGN, CONTENT ), controlling for vectors of supplier characteristics (DEVELOPER) and product characteristics (PRODUCT) (Section 3.1). PATENT and COPYRIGHT are modeled as Probit expressions, 13 denoted as ( ), as follows:
11 The number of respondents is similar to those of Yale and Carnegie surveys. 12 Indeed, we carried out the considerable investment in data collection understanding there was some risk of needing to abandon the project. We were surprised by the extent to which the sample at least roughly mirrors the population.
13 Results are similar using a linear probability model.
P r(P AT EN T
where ↵ and terms are coefficients, and ⇥ terms are each vectors of coefficients, and The source of identifying variation in the maximum likelihood estimates is simply the "residual variation" in IP choices (PATENT, COPYRIGHT ) and product design choices (DESIGN, CONTENT ), once controlling for the product category, characteristics of the product and characteristics of the developer. The use of this residual variation here is appropriate given our interest in estimating the all-else-being-equal relationship between product development and IP choices.
16
14 For developers with more than one product, product-level covariates are included by averaging across all the developer's products.
15 Estimates with linear probability models find similar signs, with smaller magnitudes and slightly lesser statistical significance.
16 The direction of causality may go a number of ways, each relevant to earlier arguments. For example, product development and IP choices might even be taken jointly. These decisions might even be somewhat arbitrary, if suppliers were to play a coordination game to occupy differentiated market positions with other otherwise similar suppliers. It is also plausible that product design is chosen first and followed by IP choices. A developer innovating in multiple ways might in the end find out that only some areas turn out to be innovative innovations, after having decided IP choices. In another possible path, an innovated product that is differentiated on multiple dimensions might lose its differentiation in areas where it does not have a well-matched IP strategy.
of interest, ↵ p and c , can be straightforwardly interpreted-particularly given the use of fixed effects for product categories, and a series of other control variables for developers and products. Do seemingly similar developers differ in their IP choices; and, if so, are differences systematically linked to the nature of differentiated innovations embodied of their products?
On the other hand, product development choices (i.e., DESIGN , CONTENT ) are endogenous, creating the possibility that some omitted variable influencing both the dependent variables and regressors could produce biased estimates. We might especially be concerned, for example, that larger and more successful developers might be more likely to invest in differentiating innovations, while at the same time being more likely to invest in IP protections-perhaps even independent of the effectiveness of these protections.
We use three approaches to dealing with the possibility of omitted variable bias:
1. Exploit the set of fine-grained developer and product characteristics, both as controls and to test robustness.
2. Exploit-as a diagnostic test-the fact that, if omitted variable bias does not play a role, patents should be unrelated to content differentiation (i.e., p = 0), and copyright should be unrelated to design differentiation (i.e., ↵ c = 0).
3. Isolate the source of identifying variation using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy.
Results. Model (1) of < Table III> IV Probit Estimates. As an additional robustness test and corroboration of earlier findings, we re-estimate model (3) on a narrower source of variation than the residual variation used above. Here we exploit just the fraction of residual variation that projects onto instrumental variables (Newey, 1987) .
The difficulty in finding appropriate instrumental variables-causing developers to differentially pursue design or content innovation without any direct effect on IP choices-is that the baseline specification is already geared to holding constant the nature of developers and products. Following this logic, residual variation in innovation choices might-in large part-simply come down to arbitrary chance or developers' "taste" for design or content.
We follow this logic, and attempt to find factors related to tastes. We reason that tastes for innovating in either content or design might relate to a developer's motivations. Here we exploit a series of indicator variables we collected on motivations. 17 We focused first on just those developers' motivations that could plausibly derive from fixed traits, rather than those most likely to reflect endogenous outcomes or transient states (e.g., reputation, learning, income). Thus, we considered as IVs indicator variables associated with motivations to "do especially challenging things," to "tackle especially interesting technical / development problems," to "be part of an exciting industry", and to "have fun". Among these, we found to "do especially challenging things," to "tackle especially interesting technical / development problems," to "be part of an exciting industry" were each significantly positively correlated, at varying levels, to both DESIGN and CONTENT, conditional on model controls. (None was found to be directly correlated with PATENT or COPYRIGHT.)
There are three caveats to emphasize in exploiting this IV strategy. First, the IV estimator is geared to measuring the effect of product development choices on IP choices, rather than the more general all-else-being relationship between the two, which may reflect two way causation or simultaneous choices (see discussion, above). Second, the IV measures reflect the views of the (individual) survey respondent and may not necessarily reflect all employees and the firm as a whole. (For this reason, we drop largest firms (>50) in the IV estimates, reducing number of observations to 569.) Third, and perhaps most important, although IVs plausibly reflect fixed traits, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of endogeneity of motivations and tastes (Bowles, 1998) .
As reported in model (4), the IV Probit estimates (Newey, 1987) of ↵ p and c remain 17 We asked developers why they chose to participate in the industry and engage in development, giving them a list of options they could check in the affirmative or not: to learn, to have fun, to increase job prospects and gain reputation through app development, to use the app themselves, to gain affiliation with a larger community of app developers, to see others using their apps, to make money, to solve interesting technical problems, to do challenging things, to be part of an exciting industry, to meet interesting people, to be an entrepreneur, or to make an income.
positive, corroborating earlier estimates. The magnitude of point estimates are larger. This is plausibly related to larger proportional differences among smaller suppliers with and without IP. Point estimates ↵ c and p (i.e., the relationship between patenting and content, and between copyright and design), themselves, continue to not be positive and are in fact negative.
It is plausible the IV estimates may be capturing a clearer negative inclination to pursue the "wrong" form of IP rights.
IP Rights and Product Revenues
Here we estimate the relationship between IP choices and revenues. To describe how revenues vary with IP choices, we proceed with a framework that considers how IP-whether in the form of patents or copyrights interacts with product development choices-to multiply or amplify by a factor ⇤ 1 some counterfactual baseline level of revenues without IP protections, R. The framework is as follows: Estimating ⇤ terms requires an estimate of counterfactual revenues without IP use, R.
We model this value as a function of developer and product characteristics:
where and ⇥ terms are each vectors of coefficients. We define R as an exponential function, akin to an approach used by Arora et al. (2008) , to constrain the baseline revenue generated by a product to be non-negative. 18 To estimate R, we use the set of developer-and product-level covariates used in the earlier Section 4, including: product category dummies, firm size, firm age, product quality rating, and hobbyist dummy. 19 Given our dependent variable here is REVENUES, (capturing the main revenue sources in the industry, download sales and in-app purchases), we also include a series of dummy variables to account for other possible revenue sources to ensure these other sources do not lead to eccentric results.
These include advertising and sales of products and services that are complementary to app distribution. Their inclusions does not affect results.
Expressions (3) and (4) are estimated simultaneously with maximum likelihood, assuming
Normal errors.
Results. Model estimates with robust standard errors are reported in Table IV 19 Results are not particularly sensitive to how R is modeled, so long as product category and developer size are included in the specification. Other combinations of variables included in the model for R provide similar results as those reported here. We report the complete set of variables for consistency with earlier analyses.
20 Adding all possible multipliers, ⇤, at once-related to patents, copyright, design and content, and all interactions-leads to statistically insignificant estimates. However, in each of the earlier specifications, if each of the excluded variables are added as regressors in the model for R, this has no effect on earlier reported estimates. For example, adding copyright and content to variables used to estimate R, does not affect multiplier estimates on patents and design variables.
we see that the relationship with copyright in model (4) is entirely accounted for with the interaction between copyright and our measure of content innovation in model (6). If, instead, the interaction with design differentiation is added to model, as in model (5), this interaction is found to be unrelated to revenues.
These results are consistent with the expected positive effect of copyright only in the case of content differentiation, and having no effect with design differentiation within the residual variation across seemingly similar suppliers.
<Table IV>
Coarse Exact Matching (CEM) Estimates.
As a supplementary corroboration and assessment of robustness of above results, we reestimate the relationship between revenues and IP choices with a coarse exact matching estimator (CEM) (Blackwell et al., 2009) . The CEM estimator attempts to construct a stricter control group by matching each treatment observation (where a developer uses a certain IP rights) to a corresponding comparison observation (where a developer does not).
The CEM match is implemented by discretizing the domain of observable characteristics (product category, firm size by employees, and firm age) to match treatment and control observations with an observation with precisely the same combination of discrete characteristics, but which differ in either patent or registered copyright use. Where there are multiple exact matching observations, we equally assign weights to each matching observation, summing to one. We do not include in the model the terms predicted and previously shown to be zero, as this matching procedure leaves only a small fraction of the data set used to estimate relationships of interest (i.e. the effective number of observations used to estimate the patent effect is 139, whereas that for copyright is 168.) We also match on the form of IP rights not estimated in the focal model and on innovation in a product not being directly tested in the model. CEM model estimates, including robust standard errors are reported in Table V . Model (1) shows the interaction between PATENTS and DESIGN is significantly related to revenues, but PATENTS and DESIGN are individually insignificant. Model (2) shows the interaction between COPYRIGHT and CONTENT is significantly related to revenues, but neither COPYRIGHT nor DESIGN are individually insignificantly related to revenues.
<Table V>

IP Rights and Technology Trade
Here we estimate the relationship between IP choices and revenues. Analogous to earlier models in Section 4, we model the probability of engagement in IP trade to IP and product development choices, along with developer and product covariates, in a Probit framework.
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Recall, the dependent variable IP_TRADE is an indicator variable switched on if either the developer engages in sale or licensing of apps or apps technologies. Coefficient estimates and robust estimates of standard efforts are reported in Table VI. Model (1) includes all terms. In relation to coefficients of greatest in interest, the model finds a higher likelihood of engaging in IP trade where patents are used in conjunction with innovative design. No other terms involving IP rights are significant. Models (2) re-estimate relationships using a CEM estimator, breaking down estimates in relation to patents and copyright to preserve statistical power and degrees of freedom. These models confirm the significant positive coefficient on patents in conjunction with innovative design, with other coefficients remaining indistinguishable from zero. <Table VI >
Conclusions
As shown in prior research, patent and copyright use have historically differed across industries, while tending to be similar across suppliers within the same industry. Differences 21 Linear models give similar results. across industries and similarities within are often even taken for granted, as when copyright is presumed to serve creative content and patents are presumed to serve industrial design or chemicals. Thus, much of past research related to use, effectiveness and economic implications of IP has tended to study either patents or copyright one-at-a-time, assessing enforceability in terms of average effects within a sector. This paper shows that as digital products take the form of digital mash-ups (amalgams of software programs and instructions, information feeds, user data, algorithms, graphics etc.), there should be a great deal more within-industry heterogeneity in IP use. This should go hand-in-hand with within-industry heterogeneity in product development choices and the precise nature of innovations embodied in digital products. This was shown to the be the case even among seemingly similar suppliers serving the same market niche.
Within-industry heterogeneity of this sort accounted for significant and economically important patterns across three distinct sets of tests: (1) heterogeneous choices of IP rights;
(2) heterogeneous consequences for performance (revenues); and (3) heterogeneous propensity to engage in IP trade, with heterogeneity in each case relating to the specific nature of innovations embodied in products. Therefore, the analysis contributes an important piece to the puzzle of understanding whether and how our IP institutions will be effective in serving a new generation of digital innovation. IP choices and product development choices may increasingly be taken simultaneously or be mutually-determined. Attempts to estimate effectiveness of one IP institution must consider these issues. Attempts to account for patents without accounting for copyright, and vice versa, or without regard to product development choices may carry less weight or meaning. Note. 27 Product Categories not reported here.
Other variables used in the analysis are described in the text. Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001). IV Probit estimated separately, not simultaneously. 2 statistic lists results for both models. IV Probit estimated on subsample employees 50. See Section 4 for discussion of instrumental variables. Note. Standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001). Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
See Section 5 for discussion on CEM matching procedure. Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01)
